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Abstract. This paper submits that efforts to achieve sustainable development at global level call
for, inter alia, institutional reform. It argues that there is no optimal institutional design, and that
different schools of thought have different perspectives of the future. It briefly presents the history
of institutional evolution in the area of sustainable development up to the latest developments in
the context of the UN World Summit on Sustainable Development. This history sets the context
for the rest of the discussions. It then presents a taxonomy of the various options suggested in the
literature for improving the institutional structure of the United Nations in order to achieve sustain-
able development. This paper critically examines the feasibility of these options from the perspective
of the different schools of thought in international relations theory. It argues that from the point of
view of idealistic supranationalists, a hierarchic supranational environment and/or development organ-
isation should be established to integrate and coordinate activities in the UN in order to promote
sustainable development governance. It argues that from a realist/neo-realist and neo-liberal institu-
tionalist approach, coordination, whether hierarchical or horizontal, is doomed to failure. From a
historical materialist approach all efforts at institutional design are likely to lead to asymmetrical
results reflecting global power relations. This paper concludes with a speculative argument that
institutional design is not a question of the best architectural option, but calls for multiple pathways
including strengthening of individual organisations, promoting the progressive development of the
law of sustainable development, developing a high level advisory body to advise the Secretary General,
promoting the concept of the decentralised network organisation and possibly finding ways to
cluster regimes. The effectiveness of these multiple efforts are dependent on the support of civil
society. In order for sustainable development to take the key concerns of developing countries into
account, it is necessary that institutions are able to represent the variety of views of their members
and that countries develop good policies domestically.
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1.  Introduction
While global wealth has increased, the environmental situation world-wide is
steadily deteriorating (Malmö Ministerial Declaration 2000)1 and global poverty
has increased.2 With globalisation, the dominant liberal ideology and its free-market
philosophy is being promoted through the various forces of globalisation and,
on the other hand, there is a reaction from global civil society to this ideology,
manifest in street protests outside major international conferences, which does
not see the liberal framework as addressing the key challenges facing the global
community.3 These developments are taking place as part of the autonomous
globalisation processes that are affecting the international community today. These
processes are inescapable, pervasive, multifaceted and interacting leading to
economic integration, rapid technological progress, the emergence of the knowl-
edge economy, improvement of logistic and transport systems, and changes in
demographic trends and business strategies.4 But the globalisation processes are
also perceived as leading to social and environmental marginalisation, increasing
the gap between rich and poor, between information and technology rich and
poor countries and social groups.5 In order to control and steer these processes
in the direction of sustainable development, there are some attempts to manage
or govern globalisation. This formal process itself can be divided into the official
governance trends within interstate forums subject to the rules of public interna-
tional law, the unofficial governance trends within the private (e.g. the Sullivan
Principles6) and civil sector domain (e.g. the Earth Charter7) and hybrid gover-
nance trends (e.g. the Type-II agreements being discussed within the context of
the World Summit on Sustainable Development8).
In an attempt to address the key global issues of the 21st century and to rec-
oncile the conflicting views through the development of common values and a
framework for action, the global community has been preparing for the World
Summit on Sustainable Development which took place in August-September 2002.9
In this context, it would be highly topical and relevant to analyse the opportuni-
ties for designing institutions10 and in particular organisations to deal with the
challenge of sustainable development.
Sustainable development, whether merely a concept or a legal principle,11 incor-
porates two ideas, to meet the needs of present generations and the protection of
the resource base for future generations and the integration of social, economic
and environmental aspects in the developmental process.12 It grew out of the
realisation that resource depletion and environmental degradation could undermine
the economy and hence it was vital to address these problems. It inspired the devel-
opment of the so-called environmental Kuznets curve which predicts that as
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societies become richer, the pollution per unit of production will decrease, and thus
promises the possibility of sustained growth.13 Sustainable development gover-
nance14 refers to the interactive network of regimes at international level that try
and integrate the various elements of sustainable development. While the concept
of sustainable development holds promise and is seen as a necessity, there are major
challenges in its implementation. While technological optimists hope that this goal
can be achieved by stimulating technological development, there is growing
evidence to show that the environment Kuznets curve may be a myth especially
in relation to global environmental problems.15 The concept is also held to have
given the existing development paradigm a new lease of life,16 but having failed
to achieve more than that in terms of operational definition17 and in terms of
reconciling development goals with environmental goals. Nevertheless, sustain-
able development is the term of choice for the global community. The sustainable
development concept has been embraced by civil society and international envi-
ronmental governance regimes.18 It has been reaffirmed by the World Summit
on Sustainable Development. 
At the same time, the autonomous globalisation process is fuelled by the ideals
of liberal democracy and the free market. Is there a dichotomy between the ideals
promoted by the dominant forces of spontaneous globalisation and managed sus-
tainable development globalisation? On the basis of a theoretical analysis, Duncan
French argues that it is wrong to dichotomise the two, and instead sustainable
development and globalisation must be seen as the two sides of the same coin
because both discourses focus on the same issues although from different per-
spectives. “Or to put it slightly differently, whilst globalisation presents the
international order with a new future, sustainable development tempers this with
a realism of past experience”.19 Sustainable development calls for integration of
social, economic and environmental goals and institutions, and hence a policy
framework within which the forces of globalisation can run their course; “because
without well-defined rules and expectations most countries are incapable of uni-
laterally protecting themselves from transboundary and global environmental
risks”.20
Against this background, the research question is: What are the different possible
institutional structures for ‘managing’ problems facing international society against
the background of the spontaneous and autonomous globalisation processes? What
kind of sustainable development governance is needed and what is feasible? 
In order to address the research question, this paper first presents a theoret-
ical framework (see section 2). It then presents a history of the international
environmental governance system in order to be able to ensure that the analysis
is based on past experience (see section 3). It presents the choices for organisa-
tional reform that are presently being discussed in the literature and policy process
(see section 4). Section 5 analyses the choices in terms of the different schools
of thought. Section 6 then draws some conclusions.
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2.  A Theoretical Framework
Is there an optimal institutional framework for managing global environmental
problems? International relations and law scholars will argue that the answer
depends on the perspective. 
The realists and neo-realists21 see global relationships in terms of power politics.
States are individual homogenous actors that will promote their domestic inter-
ests in a utilitarian and rational22 manner in the international arena. It is not in their
interest to share or give power to international organisations to undertake policies
and develop laws that could then be imposed on them. A strong state is neces-
sary to enhance the prospects of survival in the context of international anarchy.
From their perspective, any process to consolidate power at the international
level in an international organisation is unacceptable.23 To the extent that such
organisations are established, this is because of the use of the hegemonic power
of a state to steer international discussions in this direction.24 Legal positivists share
in common with realists that they look at the world as it is; but while positivists
focus exclusively on the state and status of international law, realists look at the
power struggle between states.25
Those who subscribe to the historical materialism school would argue that power
is asymmetrical in the international arena and that those with power use the
power to develop institutions that promote their interests.26
Neo-liberal institutionalists27 are likely to argue that even though power politics
implies that cooperation in the area of environmental issues is likely to be minimal,
there is cooperation. This can only be explained by realising that in specific issue
areas power configurations differ from the general global power configurations and
in such limited areas, cooperation can become institutionalised. Functionalists
among the neo-liberal institutionalists argue that international organisations have
considerable power and the ability to mobilise policymaking in particular direc-
tions and neo-functionalists see that power is also vested in international labour
movements, political parties, trade associations and supranational bureaucracies.
The interdependence school focuses on the role of the civil society, multina-
tionals and transnational coalitions. In this world-view the state is not a unitary
actor and there are several domestic actors that are also susceptible to influence
from outside. States are more likely to see other states as partners than as enemies.
Institutionalists believe that the major purpose of institutions is to help in solving
common problems.
Idealistic supranationalists would, however, argue that in order to deal with
global environmental and developmental problems, a body high up in the UN hier-
archy needs to be established, which also has a mandate and independent funds
to deal with the coordination and centralisation of environmental and develop-
mental problems within the United Nations. Idealistic supranationalist approaches
possibly have some parallels with the policy-oriented school of international law
which tries to push forward the notion of a minimum public world order and the
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goals of the community.28 Possibly there are also links with post World War I
idealism which eventually led to the establishment of the United Nations system.
Social constructivists29 study human consciousness and its influence on policy
making. They argue that interaction, communication and discourse are important
elements in influencing the determination of international policy. Such commu-
nicative processes influence the determination of national interests by creating a
shared understanding and structures that can both constrain and enable choices.30
Cognitive approaches are likely to argue that non-state actors are likely to have
a major influence on the international policy making processes. 
Table I presents some of the key features of the different schools of thought
and speculates on the future of institutional reform from the different schools of
thought. Before delving into an analysis of the reform of environmental and
developmental institutions, this paper first tries to present a concise history of envi-
ronmental and developmental governance in the UN system. The purpose of
doing so, is to ensure that lessons learnt from the past can be integrated into the
analysis of the future.
3.  History of Global Governance
Sustainable development, as highlighted above, focuses on the integration of
developmental (economic), social and environmental governance issues. It would
not be out of place here to highlight some of the key issues in the evolution of
these three elements of governance. I will, however, place maximum emphasis
on the evolution of the environmental governance process because the sustain-
able development discourse has been inspired by the environmental crises.
Economic governance can be traced back to 1945, to the aims of the UN Charter
to promote economic prosperity31 and to the establishment of the Bretton Woods
Institutions. The World Bank’s express purpose was to lend capital to promote
development and alleviate poverty. The Bank has promoted large developmental
and infrastructural projects in developing countries. The General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) promoted global prosperity through free-market trade
and the activities of GATT have now been taken over by the World Trade
Organization. At the same time, the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) was supporting technical assistance programmes to developing coun-
tries. UNDP was also funnelling resources to the other UN agencies such as the
Food and Agricultural Organisation and the World Health Organisation when
they functioned as executing agencies for projects and programmes. Although in
1947, an attempt was made to consolidate the link between the Bretton Woods
organisations and the UN, this link only provided a very special status to these
former organisations. In the 80’s when developing countries found themselves in
debt with associated social costs they needed more technical assistance from
UNDP; but around the same time, donor governments began to reduce their support
for UNDP in favour of the Bank which has to be repaid by the countries that borrow
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from it.32 Since 1968, UNDP’s share of development money fell from 65% to
25% despite its extensive network and its achievements.33 This implied support
from donor countries for liberal ideological themes such as market based man-
agement and the structural adjustment programme of the International Monetary
Fund. UNDP then found itself coping with the social consequences of the policies
promoted by the Bretton Woods institutions without the resources. The Bank’s
development policy has supported the structural adjustment programmes of the
International Monetary Fund. It has promoted liberal ideals, and has tended to
be a trend follower in terms of development strategies; focusing on reforming
domestic policies in developing countries to the exclusion of what is happening
at international level and had a very high project failure rate (37.5% in projects
till 1991).34 And yet as Agarwal et al. point out – poverty is good business for
the Bank, and for every $ the US puts into the system, US companies receive $1.10
in business.35 Other share holders also get good returns.36 In the meanwhile Bank
projects were also having environmental impacts.37 The Bank has tried to inte-
grate environmental aspects since then in its programmes,38 but there is fear that
this is merely green rhetoric. The International Monetary Fund whose objective
was to promote monetary stability has promoted programmes, some of which
may have undermined the development work of the UN agencies.39
Dadzie40 clusters the above development experience into four phases (1945–63;
63–82; 82–91; and thereafter). Between 1945–63, the UN agencies promoted
development planning and it was expected that developing countries would catch
up with the North. While the Bretton Woods institutions promoted market eco-
nomics, the UN agencies were somewhat more moderate. In the period 1964 to
82, developing countries argued that development was not something purely
domestic, but that the domestic issues were closely related to the unfair economic
framework at international level. This corresponded to the period of increasing
debt and monetary conditionalities imposed by the IMF. The developing coun-
tries argued in favour of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) leading
to the development of a rudimentary law of development.41 In the next decade
the elements of the NIEO disappeared from the international discussions, devel-
oping countries were crippled by debt, while environmental issues began to move
centre stage in international discussions. Because environmental problems were
seen to also be caused by poverty and impacted on poverty, development issues
re-entered the international agenda with the preparations for the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development.
It would possibly not be out of place to mention here that in 1961 the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was estab-
lished. The members of this organisation consisted primarily of countries that
are now part of the developed world. The purpose of this body was to promote
strong economies in its member states through the improvement of efficiency,
markets, expansion of free trade and development in the developed countries.
The OECD also has the mandate to develop recommendations and policies that are
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applicable to its member states. The OECD is seen as the think tank of the rich
world. It is not a part of the UN system, and forms a successful forum for dis-
cussion over sustainable development for the developed countries. 
In the meanwhile various Human Rights Declarations and the establishment
of related institutions had actively promoted the human rights agenda.42 Social gov-
ernance was promoted within the UN through the establishment of organisations
focused on health, food, labour, women, population and education. In the last
decades, there have also been several landmark conferences in relation to various
developmental issues. These include those on food in 1974 and 2001, water in
1977, 1992 and 2000, population in 1974, 1984 and 1994, women in 1975, 1985
and 1995, on settlements in 1978 and 1996. And yet, global poverty remains a
major issue in international society.
Soroos43 (1999) divides the history of environmental organisations into three
periods: the pre Stockholm era till 1968; the pre Rio period till the publication
of the Brundtland Report in 1987 and the Rio de Janeiro era starting in 1992. In
1972, following the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, the
United Nations Environment Programme was established. It had a limited mandate
to catalyse and coordinate policies and has over the years established some suc-
cessful databases,44 and has promoted the progressive development of international
environmental law in the areas of marine pollution, depletion of the ozone layer
and the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes leading to the adoption of
several new conventions under the auspices of UNEP. In promoting the negotia-
tions of various treaties, UNEP, ironically marginalized itself. This is because many
of the treaties developed independent secretariats based all over the world ranging
from Australia to Canada and began to lead lives of their own, which function-
alists could have easily predicted. UNEPs concern for linking environmental and
developmental issues made it an organisation that was put under pressure for a
long time by the developed countries45 and its budget has decreased since 1992.
It was not put in charge of implementing the work set out by Agenda 21 and in
1997, the US, UK and Spain demanded organisational reform.
The development agenda of the Bretton Woods institutions have had a major
influence on developing countries. The human rights (political) regime has increas-
ingly become stronger. The growing legal framework of environmental legislations
has led to a patchwork of institutions dealing with these issues. However, the devel-
opment agenda as the developing countries saw it was aborted leading to an
un-influential law of development, which today is seen as the neglected dimen-
sion of international law and of sustainable development law.46 In 2000, at the
first ever Global Summit of the Group of Developing Countries, they argued
that: “While recognising the value of the environmental protection, labour stan-
dards, intellectual property protection, indigenous innovation and local community,
sound macroeconomic management and promotion and protection of all univer-
sally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to
development, and the treatment of each issue in its competent international organ-
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isation, we reject all attempts to use these issues, as conditionalities for restricting
market access or aid and technology flows to developing countries.” They advo-
cated “a solution for the serious global, regional and local environmental problems
facing humanity, based on the recognition of the North’s ecological debt and the
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities of the developed and
developing countries”. Table II attempts to present the phases in sustainable devel-
opment governance in the UN system.
The developments at the international arena led to a proliferation of organisa-
tions and treaty regimes. The problem with all these organisations and regimes
were their individual narrow and fragmented mandates and small budgets,47 the
poor coordination mechanisms,48 lack of leadership,49 the promotion of the status
quo and incremental decisions since this is less risky50 and lack of financial inde-
pendence.51 Recognition of these problems, led to the call for the combined
environment and development agenda. In the meanwhile in 1987, the Brundtland
Commission on Sustainable Development’s Report was published making the
concept of sustainable development a central one in international discussions. In
1992, twenty years after Stockholm, the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development was held and adopted two conventions, a decla-
ration and Agenda 21. As a result of the discussions on institutional reform, in
1992 the UN Commission for Sustainable Development was set up in New York
under ECOSOC to oversee the implementation of Agenda 21. It has, however,
limited powers and resources and serves mostly as a forum for dialogue and to
make recommendations to the General Assembly.52 The Department for Policy
Coordination and Sustainable Development was established in 1993 to coordi-
nate the work on development, social and environmental issues undertaken in
the UN and act as a technical secretariat to the CSD, among others. A high level
Advisory Board on Sustainable Development set up in 1993 was disbanded in 1997.
In 1997, the United Nations General Assembly Special Session to Review
Implementation of Agenda 21 reviewed the actions undertaken and concluded
that nations needed to, inter alia, integrate economic social and environmental
objectives in national policy, improve conditions in key sectors and reaffirm the
goal of official development assistance. 
In 2001, the First Global Ministerial Environmental Forum was held in response
to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 53/242 of 28 July 1999 in Malmö,
Sweden.53 It concluded that despite all the action taken, the global environment
continued to “deteriorate at an alarming rate”. It also stated that it was “Conscious
that the root causes of global environmental degradation are embedded in social
and economic problems such as pervasive poverty, unsustainable production and
consumption patterns, inequity in distribution of wealth, and the debt burden.” 
In March 2002, at the first Conference on Finance and Development – the
UN Conference on Financing for Development held in Monterray – it was decided
that: “Our goal is to eradicate poverty, achieve sustained economic growth and
promote sustainable development as we advance to a fully inclusive and equi-
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table global economic system.” It was stressed in this context that the developed
countries should make 0.7% of GNP available for ODA and 0.15–0.20% for help
to least developed countries.54 The EU declared that it would try and achieve an
average of 0.39% ODA target by 2006 and this would imply an additional 7 billion
USD; and states that the EU contributes half the ODA world wide today. It also
agreed to untie aid to least developed countries.55 The US too agreed to increase
development aid by 50% of current levels amounting to about 5 billion dollars
in the next three years.56
The above history shows that the UN system has developed over time and
responded to different problems. At the same time, some institutions are more
powerful than others; and the Bretton Woods institutions have had a strong impact;
while the rest of the UN institutions have been influential but have had a lesser
impact. There has also been competition between the various UN bodies for
resources, power and mandate. Over time some organisations have become weaker,
others stronger. It is however not necessarily so that the organsiations that were
performing poorly have become weaker. The literature shows that the organisa-
tions that have pushed developing country perspectives have become weaker
over time and those that have pushed developed country ideologies and perspec-
tives have become stronger over time.57 The fragmentation and compartmentalisa-
tion of existing environmental and developmental governance makes Khosla ask:
“If our decisions are going to be made in the conventional, one dimensional way,
how can we hope to better a world that is entirely made up of complex linkages?”58
The question now is how should systems of governance further develop?
What is becoming clear is that all the different actors on the global stage want
to be part of the solution to the environmental and developmental crises. The World
Bank initiated talks in 1990 on environmental financing and was instrumental in
ensuring that the Global Environment Facility59 was located at Bank premises
and this was established in collaboration with UNDP and UNEP. UNEP also
presents itself as the key body to coordinate and lead environmental work in the
UN system (see the Governing Council 2001 Decision 21/21 on International
Environmental Governance). The willingness in itself is a positive sign. However,
the problem is they want to solve problems from their own perspective and not
necessarily on the basis of a new shared vision of the problem and its solution. 
The above history also shows that the UN is an extremely large body with a
number of organs, organisations and programmes all of which have, in one way
or other, something to do with developmental or environmental issues. This calls
for coordination of these activities in order to improve the quality of the outputs.
Yet, history shows that attempts to coordinate UN activities have not always
been successful. The precedent in the UN system is the Administrative Committee
on Coordination (ACC), which is chaired by the Secretary General. However, as
mentioned earlier, the UN is not a hierarchical, close-knit system. This means
that the different UN bodies see themselves as sovereign and not as part of a
total system and the ACC has only been able to play a very limited role in
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coordinating activities of the Governments.60 Another precedent is the Department
for Policy Co-ordination and Sustainable Development (DPCSD) which was estab-
lished to synthesise global information from DESIPA and other UN bodies, to
develop policy analyses and proposals on issues ranging from poverty, food
security, women, social development, science and technology, natural resources,
energy, financial flows and assistance, and the monitoring the implementation of
Agenda 21. However, the body had limited resources and impact. 
The above history also shows that North-South issues are critical in the envi-
ronment and development debate and that there are very strong cleavages between
the way problems are perceived in the North and in the South. In recent years,
international conferences are increasingly being used as a tool for promoting global
dialogue and global policymaking. How successful is such a tool? Fomerand,
Gallarotti, Barnetti and Finnemore61 are very sceptical about the usefulness of such
conferences arguing that they are merely temporary media events and do not
have significant effects. Haas,62 on the other hand, argues that such UN Conferences
contribute to the sustainable development governance process by establishing
and reinforcing themes such as socialisation, education, persuasion, discourse,
dialogue and norm inculcation. These Conferences mobilise people and states
into participating in issue of international concern. Haas, believes that the func-
tions of Conference Diplomacy include agenda setting, popularising issues and
raising consciousness, generating new information and new challenges for gov-
ernments, providing general alerts and warning of new threats, galvanising
administrative reform, adopting new norms and doctrinal consensus and promoting
mass involvement in issues. He argues that with the current approach of the United
States there is possibly little likelihood of any major substantive policy emerging
from WSSD, but feels that there may be scope for institutional reform. Most
international lawyers would also argue that these conferences develop soft law
norms that become over time acceptable to a larger group of nations and evolve
into hard law norms. 
4.  The Choices
Let us now turn to the various options in the literature in relation to the issue of
institutional design on sustainable development. There are several different pro-
posals to reform governance at UN level and I have clustered the different options
as follows:63
• Hierarchical Integrated model: One option is to develop a World Sustainable
Development Organisation. The features of such a body would be that it would
be high up in the UN hierarchy, modelled possibly after the UN Security
Council, and inspired by the Hague Declaration,64 that it would potentially
limit national sovereignty by calling on states to observe a higher degree of
responsibility to other states, and that it could make and promote policy and
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steer the other UN agencies to promote sustainable development. Such a body
could have the power to impose sanctions on states that do not comply.
• Hierarchical single issue model: Less ambitious is the option to develop a single
focus body that promotes global environmental and not local environmental
issues in all UN bodies without the risk of being ignored. The Environment
Security Council is such a proposal.65
• Non-hierarchical focal point: A third option is to develop a World Environment
and Development Organisation (WEDO) that fits within the current UN struc-
ture.66 A variant would be to focus on a Global or World Environment
Organisation,67 since in the aftermath of the UNCED negotiations, many felt
that environmental and developmental issues cannot be reconciled in one body.
This is seen as necessary by some to counter balance the power and structure
of the WTO. Such a centralisation model would be inspired by the structure
of the WTO, and call for the development of an institutional centre to promote
sustainable development and would possibly lead to the dissolution and/or
unification of UN bodies (such as UNEP, CSD and GEF), integrating conven-
tion secretariats and redefining the functions of the rest of the UN agencies.
Such a WEDO could absorb existing UN developmental and environmental
organisations (such as UNDP). A WEDO would foster sustainable development,
but would not run counter to development and poverty alleviation programmes
and this would make it more acceptable to the South.68
• Advisory body: Another option is to develop a high level advisory body that
can advise the Secretary General about the critical links between different organ-
isations and the Secretary General would use his or her discretion in pursuing
these links.
• Organisational strengthening: A fifth option is to strengthen the individual
UN agencies and try to make them the locus point of all activities that occur
in their specific field. In the Nairobi Declaration, the heads of delegation
attending the meeting declared: “That the role of the United Nations Environ-
ment Programme is to be the leading global environmental authority that sets
the global environmental agenda, that promotes the coherent implementation
of the environmental dimension of sustainable development within the United
Nations system and that serves as an authoritative advocate for the global
environment”. Upgrading UNEP in this context would mean that UNEP could
have a norm-building and law negotiating mandate similar to that of WHO
and ILO, its own budget and legal personality. Gus Speth too has proposed
that UNDP become the central organ for development work in the UN. The
Commission for Sustainable Development also seeks support to strengthen itself
and has been partly successful in its efforts since the WSSD has continued
support for it.
• Coordination through common principles – The Law of Sustainable
Development: As far back as in 1989 participating heads of states agreed that
vital, urgent and global problems call for the “development of new principles
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of international law including new and more effective decision-making and
enforcement mechanisms”.69 The idea is that sustainable development gover-
nance can be promoted by the adoption of principles which are then to be applied
in every governance context. The Rio Principles on Environment and
Development could serve as a reference point.70 The principles of the Law of
Sustainable Development as adopted by the International Law Association could
serve as an alternative reference point.71 A third choice could be the Earth
Charter which is being actively promoted by civil society72 This would lead
to the ‘greening’ of various Institutions.73
• Coordination through clustering: Another way to facilitate coordination, is to
cluster regimes into different groups. Oberthür (this issue) explains the oppor-
tunities and challenges in the different options for clustering environmental
treaties in order to optimise the impacts. 
• Decentralised network organisation: The proponents of this model favour a
decentralised, lean organisational structure that functions through networking
systems.74 Policy network theory stresses that there are networks across different
countries in specific policy areas in both the government and the non-govern-
mental sectors.75 Governance in specific issue areas occurs through the
interactions between these networks and not necessarily through a hierarchic
process within individual countries or at the international level.
Table III presents the various options for institutional reform of the UN system.
While there are different routes for interstate cooperation in establishing a gov-
ernance system, there is increasing realisation that non-state actors may be more
powerful than state actors76 and may be establishing their own systems of market
governance possibly under, but not necessarily limited to the auspices of the
WTO and the Bilateral Investment Treaties. In a desperate effort at retaining
control, new forms of corporatisation are being developed between states and
private actors.77 These include the Global Compact of the Secretary General and
Type II agreements being promoted in the context of the WSSD.78 The Global
Compact is a collaboration between the UN, civil society and business, was
proposed in 1999, and launched in 2000 with the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights, the Director of the International Labour Organisation, the execu-
tive director of UNEP, and among others the Chief Executive Officer of the
BP-Amoco. These latter options possibly fall into the spectrum of activities ranging
from hierarchical and egalitarian solidarity to market solidarity depending on
whether the UN is perceived as an interstate or a transnational actor.79
5.  Analysis
Having clustered the options, let us now examine the feasibility of the different
proposals for institutional reform from the perspectives of the different interna-
tional relations theories. The hierarchical integrated model is possibly seen as
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attractive from a idealistic supranationalist perspective. If one wishes to promote
sustainable development at global level, then one needs an organisation that can
set out the general rules and principles that the rest of the UN system then aims
to achieve. This is expected to guarantee consistency between the systems, reduce
costs of duplicative and contradictory efforts in different related regimes. This
could be a very efficient way to achieve the results the global community is
apparently committed to. Such an organisation could also be in a position to observe
the spontaneous globalisation trends and to establish boundary conditions to ensure
that such trends are consistent with the global goal of sustainable development and
in line with a global constitution.80 To the extent that the conceptual framework
of such a system matches the common aims and perceptions of civil society,
cognitive approaches would argue that civil society will support such an organi-
sational development. Neo-institutionalists, historical materialists and neo-realists
are likely to argue that such an organisation is extremely unlikely although their
reasoning would be quite different. While neo-realists would argue that the
powerful and the less powerful states are unlikely to sacrifice their individual
powers to an intergovernmental organisation, historical materialists would possibly
argue that if such an organisation were developed the interests it would repre-
sent would be skewed in favour of the powerful countries and that, hence, it would
not serve the goals of sustainable development as defined democratically. Neo-
institutionalists, especially regime analysts, would argue that by linking all the
different issues and problems together, the power configurations would become
similar to those in the general international relations sphere and hence, coopera-
tion at this level would be impossible and any effort at creating space for ingenious
problem solving would be lost. Inevitably, the creation of such a hierarchical
body would also imply that the existing relationships between the different UN
bodies would have to be changed, and most UN bodies would resist such a move.
This would also imply the amalgamation of various UN agencies, and this would
possibly be resisted by the separate agencies. The support for such an organisa-
tion would thus rest on the intellectuals who subscribe to the hierarchical view
of solidarity as the only way to address global environmental and social problems
and civil society to the extent it can unite behind such an effort.
The same arguments as made above would hold in the case of single issue
hierarchical models, except that the power configurations in relation to environ-
mental issues, will be possibly different from environmental and developmental
issues and to that extent neo-liberal institutionalists could possibly find political
space for such an option. Developing countries would possibly resist such an option
because environment would be prioritised over development issues and trade issues
as they see it, and because of the possible threat of a growth cap on their devel-
opment process.81 On the other hand, consolidating environmental issues in one
body could have some advantages for developing countries, for as Bierman82
argues, they can organize themselves better if there is only one forum for nego-
tiating these issues; and a single forum is in a better position for promoting the
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re-distribution of wealth to developing countries. At the same time, it is also
easy to argue that in such a consolidated context, the developed countries would
also be better organised and whether there would be any net benefits for devel-
oping countries remains to be seen.
The non-hierarchical strengthened environmental focal point addresses the key
issue of not antagonising the other UN organisations within the UN hierarchy. It
is thus a compromise position aiming at strengthening the centralisation of issues,
while not treading on the toes of other major UN and related organisations, their
personnel, and their members. To the extent that such a body subsumes a group
of UN organisations, it will create tensions between these bodies. While ideal-
istic supranationalists are likely to argue that there are many benefits in an
organisation which attempts at making serious links between environment and
development issues, and civil society may well be tempted to support such an
organisation, neo-realists are likely to argue that it is likely to fail, reflecting on
the inability of the Rio Conference to match the two agendas. Historical materi-
alists are also possibly likely to argue that such a venture is doomed to failure
given that both developmental and environmental issues are seen so differently
by developed and developing countries. Neo-institutionalists are only likely to
support such a process if they see it as distinct in content than all global issues
put together. But as argued earlier, given the limited ability of UN coordination
bodies to coordinate other ‘sovereign’ UN bodies, this is also likely to have a
limited effect in terms of coordination, but may achieve some results.
A high-level advisory body is, in comparison, innocuous. It does not tread on
the toes of the existing UN bodies. It does not require much funding and could
be fairly independent of support from the major powerful countries who may
choose to oppose it. It could be more flexible and more effective in that it does
not aim at coordination and control of all critical issues, but instead it focuses
on making critical communication links between the various UN agencies and their
activities and thereby may be in time to avoid or signal any major counter pro-
ductive or contradictory regime developments. It essentially advises the Secretary
General’s office. 
The goal of strengthening individual organisations and regimes and then letting
them compete with each other may be very consistent with free-market liberal per-
spectives and would fit in very well with the individual agendas of the different
UN agencies. Regime analysts would argue that regimes that succeed to depoli-
ticse issues and to cast them in terms of technological and economic terms are
more likely to address problems and, hence, they would argue in favour of iden-
tifying the easy issue areas, defining solutions for these, postponing the more
difficult issues and problems for when the time is ripe, focusing on incremental
steps and avoiding structural change.83 This would fit well with realist and neo-
realist perspectives, because states could pick and choose the organisations that
they support with financial and material support. Neo-liberal institutionalists would
also support such a process. In the final analysis if civil society is not so united
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behind its common platform as they appear to be, then it is more than likely that
it too will not be averse to such a model. Possibly it is the idealistic suprana-
tionalists who would be discontent with such a model, because this would
essentially confirm the business-as-usual nature of international relations and
this would lead to fragmented policymaking on environmental and developmental
issues.
The promotion of common ideas on sustainable development would possibly
be seen as laudable across the spectrum of political thought, though neo-realists,
and neo-institutionalists would possibly see such principles as generally irrelevant,
and nevertheless be averse to the acceptance of such ideas as open-ended princi-
ples of international law.84 Many would also feel comfortable that the gap between
the inclusion of such principles in international law documents and state practice
would imply that such principles would never enter the domain of customary inter-
national law and would draw comfort from that. However, should such principles
through juridical interpretation and state practice enter the realm of customary
international law, they could be far more influential in promoting sustainable devel-
opment in the long-term at least from the perspective of international lawyers. But,
even beyond such a positivist approach to international law, one can argue that
the developments of such principles at international level will constrain and enable
the choices made by countries. These principles will gradually form the basis of
shared understanding and if they are reasonable, compatible with other princi-
ples and predictable will lead to adherence by states and may lead to an increased
compliance pull.85 These principles will increasingly influence the determination
of national interests and may even alter the incentives for domestic actors and
thereby influence the way a state participates in international agreements.
“Interpretive communities, in this view, constrain subjective interpretations,
promote habitual compliance and improve the reputational costs on violators of
norms, as interpreted by these communities”.86 Such principles could also serve
to improve the ‘contractual basis’ of international problem solving.87 Professor
D’Amato however argues that while in tribal society social dissapproval may work,
in the international arena, physical sanctions may be needed.88 This warning is
possibly all the more relevant in the light of US reluctance to participate in
several international agreements. 
Regime clustering aims at meeting some of the concerns of the neo-realists
and neo-institutionalists. It is less threatening to the established organisations of
the UN and may offer some opportunities to increase the scope of action for the
individual regimes by pooling them together. But it is not an easy prescription, and
as the analysis of Oberthür (this issue) shows the expected efficiency gains may
be marginal and may come at the cost of dysfunctionality. Regime clustering is
hardly likely to satisfy the idealistic supranationalists or the historical material-
ists.
The concept of decentralised networks appears to be compatible with the various
schools of thought though it would be seen as inadequate by the idealist supra-
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nationalist. However, this concept is cheap and is possibly the most viable of all
the options and very dependent on the motivation of the organisations to make a
difference. 
Before going ahead let us return briefly to the hierarchical model. What becomes
clear is that for most of the different schools of thought power structures influ-
ence global policy making and there is space to make policies when issues are
divided and sub-divided; and when the ‘easy’ issues are addressed first and there
is a focus on incremental progress. The problem is that this incremental process
keeps the status quo intact between countries by not disturbing or upsetting the
concerns of the major powers coupled with an accommodation strategy to pacify
the South through policy rhetoric. The strategy does not appear be very effec-
tive in either addressing environmental or social problems.89 Which is possibly
why French argues that for sustainable development and global governance to
be linked, states must remain the key actor in global governance, and interna-
tional organisations need to reflect the diversity of the views of the member
states, provide a forum for brokering deals between these organisations, accom-
modate the positions of civil society and seek greater synergies with each other.90
Decentralised network organisations, Type-II agreements and the Global
Compact are responses to the realisation of the inability of the global interstate
governance system to control the spontaneous globalisation processes and the need
for interstate organisations to work diplomatically and through networking channels
to influence these spontaneous globalisation processes for the common good. Such
approaches do not call for major structural change in the organisational structure
and could easily appease neo-realists, neo-liberals and possibly historical mate-
rialists, but would not necessarily guarantee the framework conditions within which
sustainable development could become a reality. On the other hand, by building
on the forces that support sustainable development in civil society and simulta-
neously not wasting energy by entering into the turf battles of the United Nations,
possibly the UN hopes to capitalise on its character as a transnational institute,
while not losing its role as an interstate institute. In fact, Cronin argues that as
the UN steps into domains that are transnational in character and therefore do
not directly concern states, it takes on new work and also develops new rela-
tionships with transnational actors.91 The venture is not any less risky for the
new collaboration while possibly leading to good results does not have the insti-
tutional characteristics that guarantee accountability, legitimacy and democratic
values.92 Table IV attempts to sum up the predictions on institutional reform
from the different schools of thought.
The different schools of thought differ in their view regarding the process of
institutional reform at global level. Before going ahead, it may be useful to reflect
a little on the issue of the declining power of states. Neo-realists argue that with
the spread of liberal and free-market ideology and the processes of globalisa-
tion, the power of the state is likely to decline. By extending this argument
further, one may argue that if globalisation is indeed accompanied by the declining
INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES 379
380 JOYEETA GUPTA
Ta
bl
e 
IV
.  
Pr
ed
ic
tio
ns
 o
n 
in
sti
tu
tio
na
l r
ef
or
m
 f
ro
m
 d
iff
er
en
t s
ch
oo
ls 
of
 th
ou
gh
t
N
eo
-r
ea
lis
m
H
is
to
ric
al
 m
at
er
ia
lis
m
N
eo
-in
st
itu
tio
na
lis
m
Id
ea
lis
tic
 s
up
ra
na
tio
na
lis
ts
H
ie
ra
rc
hy
 –
 in
te
gr
at
ed
 
Im
po
ss
ib
le
, b
ec
au
se
  
If
 a
ch
ie
ve
d,
 a
ga
in
st 
th
e 
Im
po
ss
ib
le
N
ec
es
sa
ry
 a
nd
 m
ay
 b
e 
W
SD
O
st
at
es
 d
o 
no
t w
ish
 to
 
in
te
re
st
s 
of
 th
e 
So
ut
h
su
pp
or
te
d 
by
 s
oc
ia
l l
ea
rn
in
g 
lo
se
 c
on
tro
l
pr
oc
es
s 
an
d 
th
e 
co
un
te
rv
ai
lin
g
po
w
er
 o
f 
ci
vi
l s
oc
ie
ty
H
ie
ra
rc
hy
 s
in
gl
e 
is
su
e 
– 
M
os
t u
nl
ik
el
y
U
na
cc
ep
ta
bl
e,
 if
 c
on
tro
lle
d 
Po
ss
ib
le
, i
f 
co
nt
ro
lla
bl
e 
N
ec
es
sa
ry
G
EO
by
 th
e 
de
ve
lo
pe
d 
co
un
tri
es
th
ro
ug
h 
vo
tin
g 
ru
le
s
N
on
-h
ie
ra
rc
hi
ca
l f
oc
al
 
U
nl
ik
el
y
Po
ss
ib
le
 b
ut
 s
ke
w
ed
Po
ss
ib
le
, b
ut
 d
ep
en
di
ng
 o
n 
N
ec
es
sa
ry
po
in
t
ho
w
 n
ar
ro
w
 th
e 
m
an
da
te
 
is
 m
ad
e
A
dv
iso
ry
 b
od
y
Fe
as
ib
le
Fe
as
ib
le
, b
ut
 p
os
sib
ly
 
Fe
as
ib
le
Fe
as
ib
le
sk
ew
ed
St
re
ng
th
en
in
g 
in
di
vi
du
al
 
U
nl
ik
el
y,
 b
ut
 f
ea
sib
le
O
nl
y 
lik
el
y 
fo
r 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
ns
 
Fe
as
ib
le
, i
f 
th
e 
sp
re
ad
 o
f 
Fe
as
ib
le
o
rg
an
is
at
io
ns
th
at
 p
ro
m
ot
e 
N
or
th
er
n 
in
te
re
st
s
po
w
er
s 
is
 s
im
ila
r
Pr
om
ot
in
g 
co
m
m
on
 
U
nl
ik
el
y,
 p
os
si
bl
y 
Fe
as
ib
le
, b
ut
 p
os
sib
ly
 f
oc
us
ed
 
Fe
as
ib
le
, b
ut
 p
os
sib
ly
Fe
as
ib
le
 a
nd
 p
os
sib
ly
 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 o
f 
la
w
irr
el
ev
an
t
o
n
 w
es
te
rn
 p
rin
ci
pl
es
irr
el
ev
an
t
n
ec
es
sa
ry
Cl
us
te
rin
g 
of
 r
eg
im
es
U
nl
ik
el
y
Fe
as
ib
le
 b
ut
 p
os
sib
ly
 s
ke
w
ed
 
Is
su
e-
lin
ks
 p
os
si
bl
e;
 
A
 m
in
im
um
 fi
rs
t s
te
p 
to
w
ar
ds
 
ag
ai
ns
t t
he
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
ta
l 
cl
us
te
rin
g 
an
d 
in
te
gr
at
io
n 
be
tte
r 
in
te
gr
at
io
n
in
te
re
st
s 
of
 th
e 
So
ut
h
m
ay
 b
e 
ris
ky
D
ec
en
tra
lis
ed
 n
et
w
or
k 
Fe
as
ib
le
Fe
as
ib
le
 b
ut
 w
ill
 s
til
l l
ea
d 
to
 
Fe
as
ib
le
Fe
as
ib
le
 b
ut
 v
er
y 
in
ad
eq
ua
te
o
rg
an
is
at
io
n
sk
ew
ed
 r
es
ul
ts
power of states, this will affect the financial viability and power of all environ-
mental regimes negatively. In the context of the rising power of civil society and
NGOs, the impact depends on the effectiveness of civil society and the issues it
chooses. The increasing power and consolidation of financial regimes will make
financial regimes more successful than environmental regimes in achieving their
own specific goals. The increasing autonomy of trade regimes and their own system
of dispute resolution will lead to jurisprudence on environment and development
from the perspective of the trade regimes’ rules and regulations; making a similar
system within the environmental and developmental world either unnecessary or
contradictory. The increasing power of the private sector will ensure that they have
a prominent role in addressing environmental problems and that they are given
the freedom to decide how the most cost effective solutions can be reached. The
trend of the increasing gap between North and South will lead to more emphasis
being paid on the issues of the North. The increasing tension between environ-
mental protection, poverty eradication and globalisation will become more and
more pronounced. 
5.  Conclusions
This paper has argued that from an idealist supranationalist perspective, clearly the
integrated nature of environmental and developmental problems calls for an inte-
grated solution. Such an integrated solution possibly can be best promoted by an
integrated interstate organisation that has power to also control the spontaneous
globalisation processes. Such an integrated organisation at a high strategic level
in the UN can possibly steer and guide the international processes in order to
achieve sustainable development. And yet, however much, idealist supranation-
alists see this as necessary, it is likely to remain only a paper blue-print given
that the majority of international relations schools of thought are likely to argue
that this is extremely unlikely. This brings us to a range of alternative approaches
that are less intrusive while aiming at improving the coordination and links between
the different regimes. While in theory efforts to coordinate, consolidate and syn-
thesise activities of the different UN bodies could possibly do the job just as
effectively and at less cost than a hierarchical body, the historical experience shows
that within the context of sovereign UN bodies efforts from outside to coordi-
nate, consolidate and synthesise tend to fail unless such a body is made sufficiently
strong that ignoring it is not an option for the existing UN bodies. But in strength-
ening such a body further, one comes very close to a hierarchical body within
the UN system. 
I would like to end this article by speculating a little bit about the future of
global environmental governance. Given the nature of international society, it is
more than likely that we will see multiple forums and multiple organisations
pushing multiple means of promoting sustainable development. In other words, I
believe that the institutional structure is likely to remain fragmented and com-
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petitive, since by its very nature, sustainable development can be defined differ-
ently by different interest groups. In this dialectical process possibly the seeds
of the solutions to the global environmental and developmental problems may
be found. This means that unlike in the case of the World Trade Organization which
rests on a strong ideological basis, there is no competing ideological basis that
has come up with operational principles for dealing with environmental and
developmental issues in such a manner that all issues related can be dealt with
in one organisation.
This leads me to the following conclusion. Under the current political envi-
ronment, environmental governance is likely to remain a combination of organ-
izational endeavours, a network of interrelated regimes (clustered or otherwise),
type II agreements between social actors and global conference diplomacy. The
coordination to the extent that is possible could possibly be promoted by a high
level, but small body in the UN hierarchy and by the progressive development
of the law on sustainable development. The policy making in the different organ-
isations, regimes and other alliances is likely to progress on the basis of
international networking and possibly less on the basis of any hierarchical or bottom
up policy process. The combined impact of all these different endeavours is dif-
ficult to predict. While it results from the unwillingness of states to hand authority
on environmental and developmental issues in a politically and economically
divided world to an international organisation, these multiple forces are likely to
be uncontrollable and may take on a life of their own with a self-reinforcing
dynamic. 
Perhaps it would be appropriate to end with a few cautionary remarks. If sus-
tainable development is merely a hollow concept without potential for operational-
isation, or if it is a concept which merely provides existing development concepts
with a new name, perhaps the time is not yet ripe for the development of a
centralised institutional framework. To the extent that there is promise in sus-
tainable development, it may not be achievable without a strong state.93 Possibly
the notion of a declining state is a myth not verifiable by data; some argue that
it is precisely globalisation that calls for a strong state. The message that comes
out for those developing countries seeking sustainable development is that only
if they can prioritise governance structures domestically, is there likely to be any
opportunity for them to participate and influence meaningfully international
policymaking on sustainable development.94
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